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Abstract
In this paper, we define African climbing countries as those that have realised increased annualised 
economic growth since reaching a per capita GDP of US $500. We identified 16 countries out of 47 as 
climbing countries, but five of them stood out, with an average growth of 4%. We showed that climbing 
countries experienced a positive structural transformation and were still in the process of industrialising, 
whereas non-climbing countries experienced premature deindustrialisation. We then used Bayesian 
model averaging to show that growth among climbing countries occurred because of favourable trade 
policies and good use of natural resources.





Two dominant features of the sustainable development of Sub-Saharan Africa (‘Africa’ henceforth) are 
continuing concerns among policymakers, donor-aid agencies, and researchers. First, many African 
countries seem to remain in the natural resource trap and exhibit weak long-term growth as well as an 
increasing rate of poverty and inequality. Second, premature deindustrialisation has occurred in Africa 
despite high economic growth and increasing demand for manufactured products. While considerable 
attention has been paid to deindustrialisation and the natural resources curse, the success experienced 
by many African countries is much less well-understood. Understanding the factors behind the success 
of African countries is important, taking into consideration the fact that African policymakers have been 
proactive in developing policies and programs to foster structural change and accelerate economic 
growth.  
In 2000, after a period of relatively unstable, poor economic performance, Africa entered a stage of 
high, sustained economic growth. This growth trend can be divided into two periods: the boom period 
(2000-2008) and the post-crisis period (2010-present). From 2000 through 2008, the real GDP of Africa 
rose by 5.5% per year, more than twice the pace of growth in the 1980s and 1990s. Africa grew by an 
average of 2.2% in the 1980s, and, in the 1990s, the growth rate was about 1.4%. The 2007-08 financial 
crisis had only temporary effects on Africa’s growth, which picked up again in 2010. Since then, its
growth has averaged 5% annually. 
For years, Africa’s growth has been shaped by commodity prices, but the difference between
domestic reforms and ownership over development programmes explains the heterogeneous 
performance within the continent. Table 1 depicts the recent trends in GDP growth in Africa by 
classifying countries according to resource endowment. As can be seen, resource-rich (oil- and mineral-
rich) countries have higher per capita GDPs, but the growth of resource-rich countries included more 
booms and busts during the period of analysis than that of resource-scarce countries. In addition, 
resource-scarce countries have experienced increasing, stable growth since the 1980s. Heterogeneity 
can also be observed by the type of endowment, and growth in oil-rich countries is more volatile than 
in mineral-rich ones.  
Table 1. GDP growth in Africa, 1960-2018 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
  a. Mean GDP per capita
Resource-rich 1655.71 2443.00 2313.63 2143.22 2947.88 3374.77
Resource-
scarce
797.34 950.21 1028.21 1231.97 1427.00 1836.74
Oil-rich 1800.20 2951.45 2690.94 2573.73 3907.24 4281.83
Mineral-rich 1487.15 1849.80 1918.76 1755.76 2084.45 2558.41
              
  b. Growth rate of GDP
Resource-rich 4.43 5.16 2.85 3.77 5.78 3.79
Resource-
scarce
3.78 4.38 3.10 3.57 3.96 4.46
Oil-rich 3.78 5.78 2.91 5.61 7.12 3.03
Mineral-rich 5.19 4.43 2.79 2.11 4.57 4.48
Source: author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators. 
We present new empirical evidence showing that policies and endowments have driven successful 
growth in Africa. Our major contribution is that we have developed a simple method to identify 
successful countries and make use of modern econometric techniques to explain their growth in a 
systematic way. We define ‘climbing countries’ as those that have realised increased annualised 
economic growth since reaching a threshold of US $500 compared to countries with similar per-capita 
GDPs. We identified a set of climbing countries (33% of our sample) whose economies grew by more 
than 3% annually since reaching the threshold mentioned above. Among them, five countries’
economies grew by more than 4% and can be considered ‘African lions’. These economies exhibited a 
positive structural change and did not experience premature deindustrialisation. We also found that 
climbing countries can take advantage of high commodity prices and are more resilient than non-
climbing ones. Their economic growth is also driven by policy.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 documents the stylised facts that drove 
our analysis. Section 3 describes our methodology and data. Section 4 presents the determinants of 
economic growth, while Section 5 relates our findings to the literature. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Stylised facts
This section outlines several facts that motivate our analysis. First, we established the group of climbing 
countries whose economic growth stood out in the context of countries with similar per-capita GDPs.
Second, we examined how climbing countries exhibited lower dependence on commodity prices, 
fostered positive structural changes, and avoided experiencing premature deindustrialisation.  
2.1. African lions and Asian tigers  
Economists have suggested that African countries should not mimic the paths, modes, or specific 
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policies of Asian economies, given that the latter’s initial conditions differed and they followed highly 
unusual, distinctive paths of growth (Otchia 2015). To shed light on this issue, Figure 1 displays the 
evolution of real GDP per capita for African countries once they reached a per-capita GDP of US $3,000. 
Only 11 countries of the 47 in our sample reached this threshold. South Korea was also included to 
illustrate a successful case of an East Asian economy. The figure indicates considerable variations in 
African countries’ growth experiences, with some exhibiting small positive economic growth and others 
stagnating. Moreover, countries with strong positive economic growth reached the US $3,000 threshold 
before the other countries, as reflected by the more extended time series included for those countries. 
For example, South Africa, Gabon, and the Seychelles reached a mid-level per-capita GDP of US $3,000 
in 1960, 1960, and 1964, respectively, whereas Botswana and Mauritius reached the threshold in 1987 
and 1986. 
In contrast, the African countries with the fastest-growing GDPs progressed poorly compared to
South Korea. This contrast may indicate that African countries’ poor performance was unrelated to 
initial conditions, an idea advanced in the literature. For instance, the difference between South Korea 
and African countries, such as Angola and Congo, that reached the US $3,000 threshold in the same 
years is illustrative. 
Overall, the picture that emerges from Figure 1 is one in which only a couple of countries (Mauritius 
and Botswana) grew extremely quickly after reaching a GDP of US $3,000. Neither country emulated
the East Asian miracle, however. The Seychelles’ trajectory began to accelerate 40 years after reaching 
the threshold. Mauritius has become a successful case in Africa, exhibiting positive, stable growth in 
the last 25 years. Gabon and Equatorial Guinea had an initially promising trajectory. However, Figure 1 
shows a downward trend in their per-capita GDPs, beginning in the tenth year for Equatorial Guinea 
and the seventeenth for Gabon; neither country has recovered since then. Taken together, the data show 
that the growth of the large African countries is slowing, and none of them shows promising growth that 
emulates the East Asian model.
Figure 1. Cross-country comparison of African countries (countries exceeding per-capita GDP of US
$3,000) 
Source: author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators.   
We extended this analysis to African countries that experienced per-capita GDP growth after reaching 
US $500 but did not exceed US $3,000. Among the 47 countries in our sample, it appears that 32 reached 
the threshold of US $500 but not US $3,000, while only 11 countries exceeded the latter number. This 
indicates that a non-negligible number of countries is still struggling to reach moderate income levels. 
To ensure that growth patterns were not driven by the magnitude of the GDP when the countries reached 
the US $500 threshold, we computed the average growth rate between the first year and 2018, when our 
time series ended. Figure 2 illustrates this growth by contrasting it with the log of real per-capita GDP 
in 2018. This exercise reveals a clear picture of fast convergence in recent years. Lesotho, Kenya, and 
Soudan experienced rapid growth and more than doubled their per-capita GDPs. The GDP of Soudan 
has fallen since 2015 due to the devaluation of the local currency but remains high. The second group 
of countries experienced growth of between 50% and 100%; it included Nigeria, Tanzania, Guinea, 
Benin, Mauritania, and Ghana. Most of the countries in our sample experienced positive economic 
growth that did not exceed 50%. The last group suffered a slowdown and stagnation after reaching the 
US $500 threshold. Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Malawi are stagnating. The countries 
experiencing a large slowdown are Madagascar, Niger, the Central African Republic, and the DRC. 
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growth rate.  
Figure 2. Cross-country comparison of African countries (per-capita GDP between US $500 and US 
$3,000) 
Source: author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators.   
As discussed earlier, the preceding results reflected cross-sectional experiences with economic 
growth at specific points in time after reaching the US $500 threshold. In the data omitted here, we saw
a considerable variation in the number of years since reaching the threshold, which ranged from 2 to 60. 
For instance, Ethiopia reached the threshold of US $500 in 2005, whereas Chad and Tanzania reached 
it in 1990. To facilitate the identification of ‘African Lions’ on the move, we needed to obtain 
comparable measures of countries’ economic growth that considered the number of years that had passed 
since reaching the threshold. An alternative, simple way of using the data was to plot the countries’ 
annualised economic growth rates. This alternative approach appeared to be consistent with the 
countries’ trajectories when, for instance, we assumed that a similar number of years had passed since
reaching the threshold for all the countries. 
Figure 3 plots the annualised growth rates for the countries, including those above the threshold of 
US $3,000 against the log GDP per capita in 2018. The figure overlays the local polynomial regression 
with 95% confidence intervals to emphasise these trends. Given this representation, we were able to
easily assess the selected countries’ growth performance above the local polynomial regression line 
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ladder’ more than others. The set of climbing countries is represented, along with the real income 
distribution, by similar annualised growth rates. Countries like Ethiopia, Rwanda, Cape Verde, 
Botswana, and Equatorial Guinea emerge at the top, followed by Burkina Faso, São Tomé and Príncipe, 
Lesotho, Tanzania, and Uganda. The broad definition, which we use throughout this study, also includes 
countries above the local polynomial regression line, such as Kenya, Mozambique, and Guinea.  
Figure 3. Climbing countries 
Source: author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators.
Note: This figure is a scatter plot of the difference in the annualised growth rate between the year when 
each country exceeded the US $500 threshold and 2018 and the log of GDP per capita. The solid line 
represents the fitted local polynomial regression model, and the grey lines and area show the confidence 
bounds of the fitted local polynomial regression line.
2.2. Natural resources/commodities and growth 
The second driving factor is the well-known dependence of Africa’s economic growth on the growth of
commodity prices. Important literature has documented that much of Africa’s GDP growth is driven by 
booms in commodity prices and increased demand for raw materials because these countries’ economies 
depend on the export of primary commodities. Deaton (1999), for instance, argued that rising prices help 
economic development in Africa because these countries’ economies do better when the prices of 
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of growth in Africa is more than a resource boom, however. According to AfDB et al. (2013), natural 
resources have accounted for roughly 35 percent of Africa’s GDP growth since 2000. Trade, construction, 
and, most importantly, domestic economic reforms implemented in early 2000 have also contributed to 
African development. Having identified the climbing and non-climbing countries, a natural question to 
ask is whether this strong historical correlation still holds true.  
To provide new insights, we will present stylised facts about growth and commodity prices in Africa. 
Following Deaton (1999), we recalculated the price indexes from the price data of a list of 23 primary 
commodities from the World Bank Commodity Market. We also used the figures for per-capita GDP in 
constant 2010 prices from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Figure 4 shows the 
relationship between, on the left-hand scale, the growth of real per-capita GDP, and, on the right-hand 
scale, the growth in the commodity price indexes for climbing and non-climbing countries, which are 
shown as three-year moving averages. Consistent with Deaton (1999), we found a strong historical 
correlation between GDP growth and commodity prices. However, the data split shows that the 
correlation between commodity prices and economic growth appears to be greater for non-climbing 
countries than for climbing ones. The correlation between commodity prices and the economic growth 
of climbing countries over the 1960-2018 period was -0.11, which was smaller in absolute value than 
that found in non-climbing countries (0.21).  
Figure 4. Economic growth and commodity prices in Africa, three-year moving averages
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2.3. Structural changes
A third driving fact is structural changes, that is, the reallocation of resources and output from agriculture 
to industry and services. Documented as one of the key stylised features of economic development 
(Chenery 1960, Clark 1957, Kuznets 1966, Syrquin 1988), proponents of this theory generally state that 
the economic development of nations begins with a rise in industrial production and a relative decline 
in agriculture, followed by a decrease in the industrial sector and a sustained increase in services. The 
early research confirmed these structural changes for early industrialisers and predicted that other 
regions would follow the same development pattern. Recent studies, such as that of Otsubo and Otchia 
(2020), have also documented these development processes for late industrialisers. Together, these 
studies indicate that most African countries follow a backwards structural change by moving resources 
from high- to low-productive sectors.
Figure 5 compares the evolution of the average shares in each sector for climbing and non-climbing 
countries from 1960-2018. There is a clear difference between the two groups of countries. First, they 
begin with different economic structures. The climbing countries begin with the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors accounting for a relatively high proportion of the GDP and the service and 
industry sectors making a much lower contribution to it. Second, the decline in the agriculture sector’s 
contribution to the total output is distinct for the climbing countries compared to the non-climbing ones. 
Figure 5 depicts a clear downward trend in the agriculture sector’s contribution for both country groups, 
but the decrease occurs faster in climbing countries. In both cases, the proportion of the GDP accounted 
for by agriculture was below 20%.  
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Figure 5. Structural changes in climbing and non-climbing countries 
Source: author’s calculations based on the World Development Indicators. 
   
Third, there have been no significant structural changes from agriculture to industry. While we see a 
share of the GDP of roughly 25% (up from about 15%) for the climbing countries, the industry sector 
remains mostly stagnant in the non-climbing countries. The manufacturing sector has also remained 
static throughout the same period. Moreover, the industry sector reached its peak during the 2000s, but 
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apparent turning point in 1965, but the service sector’s contribution has remained virtually unchanged. 
Overall, it is evident that economic diversification is progressing slowly and is led by the service sector. 
While industry, including mining and manufacturing, is vital for the continent’s development, it has been 
observed that the value added by services has been essential to sustaining economic growth, especially 
in recent years (Otsubo and Otchia 2020). One explanation for this positive outcome is that the main 
components of services, including those related to trade, transport, and telecommunications, are 
indirectly linked to mining activities, mainly those involving copper, zinc, and cobalt. Newfarmer, Page, 
and Tarp (2018) have argued that the future of Africa lies in the service sector because of the emergence 
of industries without smokestacks, such as agro-industrial and horticultural value chains, tourism, and 
business and trade services (including information and communications (ICT)-based services and 
transport and logistics). The importance of the service sector to GDP is increasingly becoming apparent 
in developing countries, but at lower levels of the GDP. This phenomenon is well-known and resembles
premature deindustrialisation.
2.4. Premature deindustrialisation  
The classic, dominant view relates industry to the manufacturing sector because of its role as an engine 
of economic growth (Chenery et al. 1986, Kaldor 1966). Historically, rapid, sustained economic growth 
was highly correlated with an expansion in manufacturing and the reallocation of resources to more-
productive activities (McMillan and Rodrik 2011). Manufacturing has faster productivity growth than 
the service sector and agriculture, pays higher wages, and has strong spill over effects on other sectors. 
This means that a rapidly growing manufacturing sector enhances productivity growth in other sectors 
of the economy, leading to higher economic growth overall.  
To present stylised facts on structural change and premature deindustrialisation in Africa, Figure 6 
includes a comparison of the manufacturing value-added (panel A) and employment (panel B) patterns 
of climbing and non-climbing countries in the period from 1960-2018. The results demonstrate different 
patterns. The first striking observation is that climbing countries are the only group in which the share 
of the GDP attributed to manufacturing has been increasing over time. The trend accelerated in the 1980s 
but decelerated in the 2000s. In contrast, non-climbing countries have experienced falling value-added 
manufacturing shares at a lower level of GDP per capita without reaching the peak share of 0.4, as 
documented in the literature (Otsubo and Otchia 2020). The share accounted for by manufacturing 
increased in the 1970s for non-climbing countries and then decreased. As a result, many developing 
countries’ manufacturing sectors have remained extremely small and inadequate for generating 
productive employment. Deindustrialisation has reduced the potential for overall economic growth to 
generate employment and reduce poverty. For instance, the share of manufacturing-sector employment 
in non-climbing countries has been falling over time. In contrast, in climbing countries, the share of 
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apparent turning point in 1965, but the service sector’s contribution has remained virtually unchanged. 
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observed that the value added by services has been essential to sustaining economic growth, especially 
in recent years (Otsubo and Otchia 2020). One explanation for this positive outcome is that the main 
components of services, including those related to trade, transport, and telecommunications, are 
indirectly linked to mining activities, mainly those involving copper, zinc, and cobalt. Newfarmer, Page, 
and Tarp (2018) have argued that the future of Africa lies in the service sector because of the emergence 
of industries without smokestacks, such as agro-industrial and horticultural value chains, tourism, and 
business and trade services (including information and communications (ICT)-based services and 
transport and logistics). The importance of the service sector to GDP is increasingly becoming apparent 
in developing countries, but at lower levels of the GDP. This phenomenon is well-known and resembles
premature deindustrialisation.
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The classic, dominant view relates industry to the manufacturing sector because of its role as an engine 
of economic growth (Chenery et al. 1986, Kaldor 1966). Historically, rapid, sustained economic growth 
was highly correlated with an expansion in manufacturing and the reallocation of resources to more-
productive activities (McMillan and Rodrik 2011). Manufacturing has faster productivity growth than 
the service sector and agriculture, pays higher wages, and has strong spill over effects on other sectors. 
This means that a rapidly growing manufacturing sector enhances productivity growth in other sectors 
of the economy, leading to higher economic growth overall.  
To present stylised facts on structural change and premature deindustrialisation in Africa, Figure 6 
includes a comparison of the manufacturing value-added (panel A) and employment (panel B) patterns 
of climbing and non-climbing countries in the period from 1960-2018. The results demonstrate different 
patterns. The first striking observation is that climbing countries are the only group in which the share 
of the GDP attributed to manufacturing has been increasing over time. The trend accelerated in the 1980s 
but decelerated in the 2000s. In contrast, non-climbing countries have experienced falling value-added 
manufacturing shares at a lower level of GDP per capita without reaching the peak share of 0.4, as 
documented in the literature (Otsubo and Otchia 2020). The share accounted for by manufacturing 
increased in the 1970s for non-climbing countries and then decreased. As a result, many developing 
countries’ manufacturing sectors have remained extremely small and inadequate for generating 
productive employment. Deindustrialisation has reduced the potential for overall economic growth to 
generate employment and reduce poverty. For instance, the share of manufacturing-sector employment 
in non-climbing countries has been falling over time. In contrast, in climbing countries, the share of 
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manufacturing-sector employment reflected a rising trend from the 1960s-1990s before steadily 
dropping. The premature decline of manufacturing and the subsequent growing importance of the 
service sector in both developed and developing countries provides ample evidence that structural 
transformation has occurred at the boundaries of the manufacturing industry where the service sector 
has expanded due to technological innovation. 
Figure 6. Premature deindustrialisation in climbing and non-climbing countries 
Source: author’s calculations based on the Word Development Indicators.   
3. Methodology and data 
To identify the characteristics of climbing countries, we employed a simple specification of a standard 
growth equation, also known as the Barro regression (Barro 1991). Specifically, we estimated the 
following equation:  
𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = α + β𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (1) 
where 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is either the climbing-country indicator or the growth rate of per-capita GDP since the year 
when each country reached the threshold of US $500. 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the growth determinants. Following 
the guidance of the theory, and as it is typically done in a reduced form in the empirical growth literature, 
we included 16 variables representing the trade structure, institutions, demography, infrastructure, 

























1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s



























1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
b. Manufacturing Employment
Climbing countries Non-climbing countries
reaching the threshold.  
Equation 1 can be estimated using the ordinary least squares method because endogeneity is not a 
problem, as the explanatory variables are dated before the dependent one. An important concern in using 
OLS is uncertainty in selecting the growth determinants (Brock and Durlauf 2001, Temple 2000).
Another concern involves omitted variables because of missing observations in the data from early years. 
For instance, our model does not include human capital, which is recognised as a determinant of growth 
in several theoretical models (Lucas 1988, Mankiw et al. 1992).  
To partially take into account these fundamental issues in cross-country growth regressions, we 
adopted a model-averaging estimators (Magnus et al. 2010) strategy. Recent empirical growth literature 
has recently grown around the use of these models, mainly standard Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA). 
The growing literature has focused on the role of institutions in general (Lenkoski, Eicher, and Raftery 
2014), property rights (Eicher and Newiak 2013), trade (Eicher and Kuenzel 2016), energy consumption 
(Camarero et al. 2015), government spending and savings (Jovanovic 2017), and natural resources (Arin 
and Braunfels 2018), among other topics. Other researchers have tested the existing theories of growth. 
For instance, Lenkoski et al. (2014) used two-stage BMA methodology to test the findings of Rodrik et 
al. (2004) and found support for more determinants of economic growth. Magnus et al. (2010) re-
examined the data used by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) by accounting for many models with different 
instruments and growth determinants. They also found that carefully addressing a model’s uncertainty 
led to better results.
The advantage of the BMA method is that it is a data-driven model in which uncertainties are
carefully addressed. All combinations of 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are estimated and a subset of explanatory variables that 
maximises the predictive power of the model is selected. The unconditional BMA estimates are then 
computed from a weighted average of the estimates of each of the possible models in the model space, 
with the weights measured by the posterior model’s probabilities. The weights are chosen according to 
the models’ fitness so that models that better explain the data have a greater weight and, thus, a greater 
impact on the results. The BMA, therefore, produces unconditional estimates in the sense that they do 
not depend on a single model. Instead, the BMA relies on the evidence provided by the data. We followed
the tradition of selecting the variables with a posterior inclusion probability (PIP) of 0.50 or greater as 
the most important ones for the interpretation of the results. In the second step, we used the parsimonious 
model in an OLS regression containing the selected explanatory variables.  
The data and their sources are listed in Table 2. The data on the annualised growth rates of the per-
capita GDPs were calculated from the first year each country reached the threshold of US $500 until the 
last year available in the dataset, which was usually 2018. We constructed the institutional variable by 
considering the first principal components of civil liberties and political rights. The variables’
demography was constructed in a similar manner by combining the fertility rate and dependence ratio. 
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reaching the threshold.  
Equation 1 can be estimated using the ordinary least squares method because endogeneity is not a 
problem, as the explanatory variables are dated before the dependent one. An important concern in using 
OLS is uncertainty in selecting the growth determinants (Brock and Durlauf 2001, Temple 2000).
Another concern involves omitted variables because of missing observations in the data from early years. 
For instance, our model does not include human capital, which is recognised as a determinant of growth 
in several theoretical models (Lucas 1988, Mankiw et al. 1992).  
To partially take into account these fundamental issues in cross-country growth regressions, we 
adopted a model-averaging estimators (Magnus et al. 2010) strategy. Recent empirical growth literature 
has recently grown around the use of these models, mainly standard Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA). 
The growing literature has focused on the role of institutions in general (Lenkoski, Eicher, and Raftery 
2014), property rights (Eicher and Newiak 2013), trade (Eicher and Kuenzel 2016), energy consumption 
(Camarero et al. 2015), government spending and savings (Jovanovic 2017), and natural resources (Arin 
and Braunfels 2018), among other topics. Other researchers have tested the existing theories of growth. 
For instance, Lenkoski et al. (2014) used two-stage BMA methodology to test the findings of Rodrik et 
al. (2004) and found support for more determinants of economic growth. Magnus et al. (2010) re-
examined the data used by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) by accounting for many models with different 
instruments and growth determinants. They also found that carefully addressing a model’s uncertainty 
led to better results.
The advantage of the BMA method is that it is a data-driven model in which uncertainties are
carefully addressed. All combinations of 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are estimated and a subset of explanatory variables that 
maximises the predictive power of the model is selected. The unconditional BMA estimates are then 
computed from a weighted average of the estimates of each of the possible models in the model space, 
with the weights measured by the posterior model’s probabilities. The weights are chosen according to 
the models’ fitness so that models that better explain the data have a greater weight and, thus, a greater 
impact on the results. The BMA, therefore, produces unconditional estimates in the sense that they do 
not depend on a single model. Instead, the BMA relies on the evidence provided by the data. We followed
the tradition of selecting the variables with a posterior inclusion probability (PIP) of 0.50 or greater as 
the most important ones for the interpretation of the results. In the second step, we used the parsimonious 
model in an OLS regression containing the selected explanatory variables.  
The data and their sources are listed in Table 2. The data on the annualised growth rates of the per-
capita GDPs were calculated from the first year each country reached the threshold of US $500 until the 
last year available in the dataset, which was usually 2018. We constructed the institutional variable by 
considering the first principal components of civil liberties and political rights. The variables’
demography was constructed in a similar manner by combining the fertility rate and dependence ratio. 
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The initial period values were used to avoid possible endogeneity issues. Table 3 shows the descriptive 
statistics of the data, with the climbing countries representing 33% of our sample.   
Table 2. Description of data used in the regression analysis for countries that reached the US $500 
threshold  
Variables Description Source 
Oil price Oil price
World Bank Commodity 
Market 
Mineral price Mineral price
World Bank Commodity 
Market 
Investment
Share of gross capital formation at current 
PPPs
Penn World Table
Foreign value added Foreign value added Eora MRIO
Domestic value added Domestic value added Eora MRIO
Colonial dependence Colonial administrative status Sachs and Warner (1997)
Investment price
Price level of capital formation, price 
level of USA GDP in 2011=1
Penn World Table
Trade openness Openness to international trade Penn World Table 
Landlocked status












Percentage of total land area in the tropics 
(between the Tropics of Capricorn and 
Cancer)









Urban population growth 
World Development 
Indicators 
Institutional status  
PCA of the fertility rate and dependence 
ratio
Freedom House 
Demography PCA of civil liberties and political rights World Development 
Indicators 
Log GDP per capita Log of per-capita GDP in 1960 
World Development 
Indicators 
Life expectancy Life expectancy (1960)
World Development 
Indicators 





Growth rate 47 1.29 1.74 -1.6 6.6
Climbing country status 47 0.33 0.48 0 1
Oil price 47 80.89 11.10 44.7 98.9 
Mineral price 47 59.38 14.32 35.9 91.7 
Investment 41 0.20 0.14 0.0 0.6
Foreign value added 40 9.71 5.17 0 17.5 
Domestic value added 40 11.28 5.55 0 19.0 
Colonial dependence 43 0.12 0.32 0 1
Investment price 41 0.30 0.35 0.0 2.1
Trade openness 41 -0.05 0.09 -0.5 0.1
Landlocked status 47 0.31 0.47 0 1
Oil-rich status 47 0.19 0.39 0 1
Mineral-rich status 47 0.21 0.41 0 1
Tropical location 43 0.89 0.28 0 1
Rural population growth 41 1.98 0.83 0.0 4.7
Urban population growth 41 5.79 2.82 1.1 16.6 
Institutional status  42 0.00 1.38 -2.8 2.0
Demography 41 0.00 1.24 -3.5 2.0
Log GDP per capita 42 6.81 0.67 6.2 8.4
Life expectancy 39 3.73 0.13 3.5 4.1
4. Results 
Columns 1-2 in Table 4 include estimates of the specifications of Equation 1 using the dummy of 
‘climbing countries’ as our dependent variable. Columns 1 reports the posterior means, and Column 2 
the PIPs. The findings reveal that mineral prices are a significant explanatory variable of growth, as their
inclusion probability is the highest. The second significant determinant is the oil price. We find that 
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natural resource endowment, a proxy for oil- and mineral rich-countries, is a weak driver of climbing 
countries’ status. The effect of the mineral price is positive, whereas the effect of the oil price is negative, 
but the magnitude of the latter is slightly higher and not statistically different from zero. Nonetheless, 
the fact that the price of natural resources is a significant explanatory variable of growth can be 
interpreted in favour of resource-dependent growth.  
The effect of countries’ participation in global value chains (GVCs) on their likelihood of climbing 
is also robust but less precisely estimated. The effect of the foreign value-added component is positive, 
but the domestic value-added component has a negative effect on a country’s likelihood of climbing. 
Notably, the effect of trade is also positive, but it is not robust. Taken at face value, this finding suggests 
that the robust, strong positive effect of trade on growth works through backward and forward GVC 
participation. The negative effect of the domestic value-added component corroborates the findings of 
Dollar et al. (2019), who argued that the ratio of the domestic value-added component to the gross export 
value tends to fall as a developing country moves from the export of primary products to the that of 
manufactured goods and services via GVCs. The positive effect of the domestic value-added component 
on a country’s likelihood of climbing implies that African countries are increasingly upgrading their 
technology because of increased integration into international production networks. The literature has 
cited China as the only country to achieve a simultaneous increase in domestic value-added exports and 
a high GDP growth rate due to a substantial improvement in technology and reduced trade costs. 
However, this is not the case in Africa, as most countries are confined to commodities-related value 
chains (World Bank 2020). Therefore, the presence of a negative sign seems plausible within our context, 
as imported intermediate inputs and services are key to encouraging value-added economic growth.  
Our model also supports the relevance of initial GDP per capita and life expectancy. We found that 
the effects of initial GDP per capita and life expectancy were robust and precisely estimated. We found 
that the other variables were not robust determinants of climbing status. However, some findings are 
worth noting. First, we found that having a tropical location had a negative effect on climbing status, as 
suggested by Masters and McMillan (2001) and Hsiang and Meng (2015). Contrary to widespread 
beliefs, we found a positive effect of urban population growth on climbing status and a negative effect 
(less robust) of rural growth on it. 
Columns 3-4 of Table 4 show the BMA results for the annualised GDP per-capita growth rate. If 
anything, the results confirm the importance of mineral prices in explaining economic growth in Africa, 
given that it has a posterior inclusion probability of 0.87. The other findings were qualitatively verified, 
but the estimates were not precise. 
We will now turn our attention to parsimonious analysis by applying a regression model to the most 
robust determinant of climbing status and growth obtained from the BMA exercise. Since the BMA 
provided some data-driven intuition for the correct model, OLS regression seemed appropriate for 
situations in which a small number of pre-determined variables existed. Columns 5-6 of Table 4 present 
the regression results when the dependent variable was climbing status. We focused on initial GDP per 
capita, life expectancy, oil price, mineral price, and the foreign and domestic value-added component 
for several reasons. By focusing on such variables, we had the ability to confidently determine that the 
regression model had sufficient degrees of freedom to assess the robustness of our results. Moreover, 
we had the ability to compare our findings to the estimates available in the literature. As expected, all 
the variables were statistically significant because of the robustness and flexibility of the BMA. Thus, 
the OLS results confirmed the previous findings that commodities prices, GVC participation, and initial 
conditions were likely the key drivers of climbing status. One important message communicated by this 
table was that the magnitude of the oil prices was much larger than that of the mineral prices. In Columns 
7-8, we focused on the model estimating the annualised growth rate based on the three variables we 
identified from the BMA model, namely life expectancy, mineral prices, and foreign as well as domestic 
value-added factors in gross exports. We found that all the variables were statistically significant with 
the expected signs. 
Table 4. Factors explaining the success of climbing countries  
Dependent 
variable Climbing country status  Growth rate Climbing country status Growth rate









Coefficient Standard error Coefficient
Standard 
error
Oil price -0.0211 0.74 -0.0163 0.25 -0.030*** (0.006)
Mineral price 0.0202 0.90 0.0621 0.87 0.023*** (0.006) 0.074*** (0.022)
Investment 0.0079 0.06 0.2832 0.12     
Foreign value added 0.0503 0.49 0.0243 0.15 0.113*** (0.023) 0.258* (0.145)
Domestic value 
added -0.0404 0.46 -0.0400 0.23 -0.093*** (0.021) -0.297** (0.131)
Colonial 
dependence 0.0094 0.10 0.0340 0.08
    
Investment price 0.0121 0.10 0.1193 0.13     
Trade openness 0.0054 0.06 0.0079 0.06     
Landlocked status 0.0143 0.10 0.0676 0.11     
Oil-rich status -0.0010 0.06 0.0394 0.08     
Mineral-rich status 0.0027 0.07 0.0067 0.06     
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natural resource endowment, a proxy for oil- and mineral rich-countries, is a weak driver of climbing 
countries’ status. The effect of the mineral price is positive, whereas the effect of the oil price is negative, 
but the magnitude of the latter is slightly higher and not statistically different from zero. Nonetheless, 
the fact that the price of natural resources is a significant explanatory variable of growth can be 
interpreted in favour of resource-dependent growth.  
The effect of countries’ participation in global value chains (GVCs) on their likelihood of climbing 
is also robust but less precisely estimated. The effect of the foreign value-added component is positive, 
but the domestic value-added component has a negative effect on a country’s likelihood of climbing. 
Notably, the effect of trade is also positive, but it is not robust. Taken at face value, this finding suggests 
that the robust, strong positive effect of trade on growth works through backward and forward GVC 
participation. The negative effect of the domestic value-added component corroborates the findings of 
Dollar et al. (2019), who argued that the ratio of the domestic value-added component to the gross export 
value tends to fall as a developing country moves from the export of primary products to the that of 
manufactured goods and services via GVCs. The positive effect of the domestic value-added component 
on a country’s likelihood of climbing implies that African countries are increasingly upgrading their 
technology because of increased integration into international production networks. The literature has 
cited China as the only country to achieve a simultaneous increase in domestic value-added exports and 
a high GDP growth rate due to a substantial improvement in technology and reduced trade costs. 
However, this is not the case in Africa, as most countries are confined to commodities-related value 
chains (World Bank 2020). Therefore, the presence of a negative sign seems plausible within our context, 
as imported intermediate inputs and services are key to encouraging value-added economic growth.  
Our model also supports the relevance of initial GDP per capita and life expectancy. We found that 
the effects of initial GDP per capita and life expectancy were robust and precisely estimated. We found 
that the other variables were not robust determinants of climbing status. However, some findings are 
worth noting. First, we found that having a tropical location had a negative effect on climbing status, as 
suggested by Masters and McMillan (2001) and Hsiang and Meng (2015). Contrary to widespread 
beliefs, we found a positive effect of urban population growth on climbing status and a negative effect 
(less robust) of rural growth on it. 
Columns 3-4 of Table 4 show the BMA results for the annualised GDP per-capita growth rate. If 
anything, the results confirm the importance of mineral prices in explaining economic growth in Africa, 
given that it has a posterior inclusion probability of 0.87. The other findings were qualitatively verified, 
but the estimates were not precise. 
We will now turn our attention to parsimonious analysis by applying a regression model to the most 
robust determinant of climbing status and growth obtained from the BMA exercise. Since the BMA 
provided some data-driven intuition for the correct model, OLS regression seemed appropriate for 
situations in which a small number of pre-determined variables existed. Columns 5-6 of Table 4 present 
the regression results when the dependent variable was climbing status. We focused on initial GDP per 
capita, life expectancy, oil price, mineral price, and the foreign and domestic value-added component 
for several reasons. By focusing on such variables, we had the ability to confidently determine that the 
regression model had sufficient degrees of freedom to assess the robustness of our results. Moreover, 
we had the ability to compare our findings to the estimates available in the literature. As expected, all 
the variables were statistically significant because of the robustness and flexibility of the BMA. Thus, 
the OLS results confirmed the previous findings that commodities prices, GVC participation, and initial 
conditions were likely the key drivers of climbing status. One important message communicated by this 
table was that the magnitude of the oil prices was much larger than that of the mineral prices. In Columns 
7-8, we focused on the model estimating the annualised growth rate based on the three variables we 
identified from the BMA model, namely life expectancy, mineral prices, and foreign as well as domestic 
value-added factors in gross exports. We found that all the variables were statistically significant with 
the expected signs. 
Table 4. Factors explaining the success of climbing countries  
Dependent 
variable Climbing country status  Growth rate Climbing country status Growth rate









Coefficient Standard error Coefficient
Standard 
error
Oil price -0.0211 0.74 -0.0163 0.25 -0.030*** (0.006)
Mineral price 0.0202 0.90 0.0621 0.87 0.023*** (0.006) 0.074*** (0.022)
Investment 0.0079 0.06 0.2832 0.12     
Foreign value added 0.0503 0.49 0.0243 0.15 0.113*** (0.023) 0.258* (0.145)
Domestic value 
added -0.0404 0.46 -0.0400 0.23 -0.093*** (0.021) -0.297** (0.131)
Colonial 
dependence 0.0094 0.10 0.0340 0.08
    
Investment price 0.0121 0.10 0.1193 0.13     
Trade openness 0.0054 0.06 0.0079 0.06     
Landlocked status 0.0143 0.10 0.0676 0.11     
Oil-rich status -0.0010 0.06 0.0394 0.08     
Mineral-rich status 0.0027 0.07 0.0067 0.06     
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Dependent 
variable Climbing country status  Growth rate Climbing country status Growth rate
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tropical location -0.1031 0.26 -0.0486 0.08     
Rural population 
growth -0.0060 0.09 -0.0785 0.17
    
Urban population 
growth 0.0097 0.26 0.0952 0.45
    
Institutional status  0.0045 0.10 0.0017 0.06     
Demography 0.0036 0.09 -0.0296 0.12     
Log GDP per capita -0.2543 1.00 -0.3679 1.00 -0.248* (0.134)
Life expectancy 1.8019 1.00 7.0055 1.00 1.825*** (0.479) 6.411*** (1.980)
Constant -4.1862 1.00 -24.9850 1.00 -3.764*** (1.319) -21.371*** (6.419)
         
Estimation method BMA BMA OLS OLS
Observations 36 36 36 36
R-squared     0.716 0.575
Note: This table reports the determinants of the success of climbing countries obtained from several 
regressions. In columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes 1 for 
climbing countries and 0 for non-climbing countries. In Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8, the annualised growth 
rate is used as the dependent variable. 
5. Relation to the literature
In sum, we can report two major findings: we found that mineral and oil prices had a high probability 
of explaining countries’ climbing status and that the nature of participation in the GVC mattered more 
than simple exposure to international trade. How do our findings relate to the literature, then?
Previous research (Alexeev and Conrad 2009, Lederman and Maloney 2007, Sachs and Warner 1995)
provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between commodity prices and 
economic growth. However, there is an ongoing debate about the interaction between commodity prices 
and economic performance due to mixed empirical results. Under various hypotheses regarding the 
nature of a country’s endowment (Akinlo and Apanisile 2010, Eggoh et al. 2011) and its short- or long-
term prospects (Bashiri Behmiri and Pires Manso 2013, Nkomo 2006, Otchia 2019), higher commodity 
prices will either have a positive effect on net-exporting countries or a negative effect on net-importing 
ones. Starting with an analysis of oil prices, Gbatu et al. (2017) found that, in Liberia, increased oil 
prices have not been detrimental to economic growth because of the reallocation of labour and capital 
into oil-intensive sectors during the price boom. Other studies conducted in net-oil-importing countries 
have shown positive short-term effects on growth. While there is abundant literature describing the effect 
of oil prices on growth, few researchers have examined the effects of oil prices on the various phases of 
business cycles. One study by Balcilar et al. (2017) showed that net importers of oil, such as South 
Africa, can be expected to be vulnerable to oil price shocks irrespective of the phase of the business 
cycle. Most of these studies used oil price data from the 1970s. Research using a longer series from the 
United States (Gadea et al. 2016) showed evidence of nonlinearity in the relationship between oil prices 
and economic growth. While our data do not reflect this evidence, our study makes a significant 
contribution to the literature, as we used price data from 1960 to explain long-term growth.  
Other studies have shown the relationship between mineral prices and economic growth in Africa 
(Deaton 1999). Perhaps the most comparable study to ours was done by Foster-McGregor et al. (2018).
By separating energy from non-energy prices, they found that the former had a significant long-term 
resource curse effect, while increased non-energy commodity prices raised the long-term GDP per capita. 
Our findings on the positive effect on mineral prices are important for several reasons. They provide 
deeper insight into the debate on whether Africa should adopt a comparative advantage-defying strategy 
or promote industries that correspond to its countries’ current endowment structures (Lin and Chang 
2009, Otchia 2015). Our findings showing that mineral prices positively affect economic growth suggest 
that development strategies for the continent should make natural resources more inclusive by better 
managing revenues from them and from exchange rates (Otchia and Asongu 2020, Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian 2013).
By analysing the foreign and domestic value-added component of exports, we have written a paper 
that belongs to an emerging strand of literature examining the effects of trade in value-added 
commodities on economic growth. For example, World Bank (2020) showed that most of the recent 
poverty reduction throughout the world is strongly linked to the GVC participation of a few countries 
(China, Vietnam, and Bangladesh). In Africa, however, the rates of inequality and poverty have 
increased despite increased participation in GVCs. Otsubo and Otchia (2020) pointed out that the inter-
country dispersion of the impact of GVCs can be persistent because African countries are confined to 
the low-value-added commodities segments of value chains without much prospect for industry 
upgrades. This study shows that Africa can succeed in GVCs by reducing the domestic value-added
component in exports and increasing foreign value-added exports through imports of sophisticated 
intermediate inputs.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigated the link between policies, institutions, and endowments and economic 
growth in Africa. To analyse this relationship, we proposed a simple, intuitive methodology to identify 
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Dependent 
variable Climbing country status  Growth rate Climbing country status Growth rate
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tropical location -0.1031 0.26 -0.0486 0.08     
Rural population 
growth -0.0060 0.09 -0.0785 0.17
    
Urban population 
growth 0.0097 0.26 0.0952 0.45
    
Institutional status  0.0045 0.10 0.0017 0.06     
Demography 0.0036 0.09 -0.0296 0.12     
Log GDP per capita -0.2543 1.00 -0.3679 1.00 -0.248* (0.134)
Life expectancy 1.8019 1.00 7.0055 1.00 1.825*** (0.479) 6.411*** (1.980)
Constant -4.1862 1.00 -24.9850 1.00 -3.764*** (1.319) -21.371*** (6.419)
         
Estimation method BMA BMA OLS OLS
Observations 36 36 36 36
R-squared     0.716 0.575
Note: This table reports the determinants of the success of climbing countries obtained from several 
regressions. In columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes 1 for 
climbing countries and 0 for non-climbing countries. In Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8, the annualised growth 
rate is used as the dependent variable. 
5. Relation to the literature
In sum, we can report two major findings: we found that mineral and oil prices had a high probability 
of explaining countries’ climbing status and that the nature of participation in the GVC mattered more 
than simple exposure to international trade. How do our findings relate to the literature, then?
Previous research (Alexeev and Conrad 2009, Lederman and Maloney 2007, Sachs and Warner 1995)
provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between commodity prices and 
economic growth. However, there is an ongoing debate about the interaction between commodity prices 
and economic performance due to mixed empirical results. Under various hypotheses regarding the 
nature of a country’s endowment (Akinlo and Apanisile 2010, Eggoh et al. 2011) and its short- or long-
term prospects (Bashiri Behmiri and Pires Manso 2013, Nkomo 2006, Otchia 2019), higher commodity 
prices will either have a positive effect on net-exporting countries or a negative effect on net-importing 
ones. Starting with an analysis of oil prices, Gbatu et al. (2017) found that, in Liberia, increased oil 
prices have not been detrimental to economic growth because of the reallocation of labour and capital 
into oil-intensive sectors during the price boom. Other studies conducted in net-oil-importing countries 
have shown positive short-term effects on growth. While there is abundant literature describing the effect 
of oil prices on growth, few researchers have examined the effects of oil prices on the various phases of 
business cycles. One study by Balcilar et al. (2017) showed that net importers of oil, such as South 
Africa, can be expected to be vulnerable to oil price shocks irrespective of the phase of the business 
cycle. Most of these studies used oil price data from the 1970s. Research using a longer series from the 
United States (Gadea et al. 2016) showed evidence of nonlinearity in the relationship between oil prices 
and economic growth. While our data do not reflect this evidence, our study makes a significant 
contribution to the literature, as we used price data from 1960 to explain long-term growth.  
Other studies have shown the relationship between mineral prices and economic growth in Africa 
(Deaton 1999). Perhaps the most comparable study to ours was done by Foster-McGregor et al. (2018).
By separating energy from non-energy prices, they found that the former had a significant long-term 
resource curse effect, while increased non-energy commodity prices raised the long-term GDP per capita. 
Our findings on the positive effect on mineral prices are important for several reasons. They provide 
deeper insight into the debate on whether Africa should adopt a comparative advantage-defying strategy 
or promote industries that correspond to its countries’ current endowment structures (Lin and Chang 
2009, Otchia 2015). Our findings showing that mineral prices positively affect economic growth suggest 
that development strategies for the continent should make natural resources more inclusive by better 
managing revenues from them and from exchange rates (Otchia and Asongu 2020, Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian 2013).
By analysing the foreign and domestic value-added component of exports, we have written a paper 
that belongs to an emerging strand of literature examining the effects of trade in value-added 
commodities on economic growth. For example, World Bank (2020) showed that most of the recent 
poverty reduction throughout the world is strongly linked to the GVC participation of a few countries 
(China, Vietnam, and Bangladesh). In Africa, however, the rates of inequality and poverty have 
increased despite increased participation in GVCs. Otsubo and Otchia (2020) pointed out that the inter-
country dispersion of the impact of GVCs can be persistent because African countries are confined to 
the low-value-added commodities segments of value chains without much prospect for industry 
upgrades. This study shows that Africa can succeed in GVCs by reducing the domestic value-added
component in exports and increasing foreign value-added exports through imports of sophisticated 
intermediate inputs.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigated the link between policies, institutions, and endowments and economic 
growth in Africa. To analyse this relationship, we proposed a simple, intuitive methodology to identify 
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climbing countries as those marked by sustained, high levels of economic growth compared to other
countries with similar per capita GDPs. The advantages of our approach were that we could
accommodate various thresholds above which we defined success and various indicators, such as 
manufacturing shares of GDP. We showed that 33% of countries were climbing the ladder of economic 
development, while the rest of the countries were either stagnant or experienced negative economic 
growth. The climbing countries exhibited positive structural changes and did not experience premature 
deindustrialisation.  
We shed new light on the determinants of climbing status and sustained increases in economic growth. 
We found that mineral and oil prices were strong determinants of climbing status. We also found that oil 
prices had a negative effect on growth and that policies that fostered structural change helped mitigate 
these effects. We also showed that the type of participation in GVCs mattered more than simple trade-
openness measures. Our results suggest that African countries can sustain high growth rates by reducing 
the domestic value-added component of exports and increasing the foreign value-added one. Finally, our 
findings supported the existing evidence on the role of initial GDP per capita and life expectancy in this 
phenomenon. Taken together, our findings imply that the role of policies and endowments is especially 
important in creating champions in Africa.   
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